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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Vance Watkins was charged with a single count of lewd conduct with a minor.
His case originally went to trial in 2005 and he was found guilty by the jury; however, his
conviction and sentence were eventually vacated by the Idaho Supreme Court and his
case was remanded for a new trial.
In 2010, Mr. Watkins' case went to trial for a second time.

During the retrial,

despite a stipulation that no mention be made of the first trial, one of the State's
witnesses revealed to the jury that, not only had there been a previous trial, but also an
appeal.

Based on this testimony, which Mr. Watkins argued was tantamount to

informing the jury that he had previously been convicted, Mr. Watkins moved for a
mistrial. That motion, however, was denied by the district and, at the conclusion of the
second trial, Mr. Watkins was again found guilty by the jury.
Mr. Watkins appeals.

On appeal, he contends that the district court erred in

denying his motion for a mistrial because the testimony informing the jury of ~1is
previous conviction in this case denied him a fair trial.
In response, the State argues that the district court did not err. It offers a number
of arguments, procedural and substantive.
This Reply Brief is necessary to point out the reasons why each and every one of
the State's arguments fails.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The factual and procedural histories of this case were set forth in detail in
Mr. Watkins' Appellant's Brief and, therefore, are not repeated herein.

1

ISSUE
Did the district court err in denying Mr. Watkins' motion for a mistrial, made after a
State's witness revealed that Mr. Watkins had an earlier trial and appeal in this case?

2

ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred In Denying Mr. Watkins' Motion For A Mistrial, Made After A
State's Witness Revealed That Mr. Watkins Had An Earlier Trial And Appeal In This
Case

A.

Introduction
When Officer Archuleta testified that Mr. Watkins had a previous trial and appeal

in this case, the most reasonable inference for the jury to draw was that Mr. Watkins
had previously been found guilty, but had his conviction overturned on appeal. Given
the overwhelming prejudice attendant to such a disclosure to a lay jury, Mr. Watkins has
argued that this testimony deprived him of a fair trial and, therefore, it was error for the
district court to have denied his motion for a mistrial.
In response, the State proffers three arguments.

First, after mischaracterizing

the applicable legal standard, the State seeks to have this Court rule against
I\Jlr. Watkins for not having satisfied a non-existent standard. Second, the State sets up
a "straw man" argument by mischaracterizing one of Mr. Watkins' arguments as a
statement of "fact," then knocks down its "straw man" by pointing out that the district
court concluded otherwise.

Finally, based on its own interpretation of Officer

Archuletta's testimony (construing that testimony as alerting the jury only to the fact of a
prior trial, not a guilty verdict), the State argues that the district court was correct to have
denied Mr. Watkins' motion for a mistrial.
For the reasons set forth in detail below, the State's present arguments are
without merit.

3

B.

Applicable Legal Standards
The legal standards applicable to this case were set forth in IVlr. Watkins'

Appellant's Brief.

(pp.9-13.)

The State does not outwardly challenge any of these

standards and, in fact, explicitly agrees with some of them.

For instance, the State

appears to concede that revealing that a defendant has previously been found guilty by
a jury in the same case is so prejudicial as to require a mistrial. ( See Respondent's
Brief, pp.9-11.) Also, the State concedes that the standard of review of a denial of a
motion for a mistrial, although described as an "abuse of discretion" standard, "is one of
reversible error." (Respondent's Brief, p.6.)
However, the State then goes on to argue that, because a "curative instruction"
was given following Officer Archuletta's improper testimony, it is Mr. Watkins' burden to
"show[] that 'there is an "overwhelming probability" that the jury [was] unable to follow
the court's instructions, and a strong likelihood that the effect of the [testimony] [was]
"devastating" to"' to him. (Respondent's Brief, p.7 (quoting State v. Hill, 140 Idaho 625,
631 (Ct. App. 2004)).) This is not correct. As was set forth in Mr. Watkins' Appellant's
Brief (p.13), the standard is simply one of reversible error. See, e.g., State v. Shepherd,
124 Idaho 54, 57 (Ct. App.1993) (quoting State v. Urquhart, 105 Idaho 92, 95 (Ct.
App.1983)).

1

The standard urged by the State in t~1is case is derived from dicta in a footnote in
a sharply-divided United States Supreme Court opinion. 2 See Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S.

1

Lest there be any lingering doubt as to whether the Shepherd/Urquhart "reversible
error" standard is controlling in Idaho, it should be observed that the Idaho Supreme
Court explicitly adopted this standard in State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 571 (2007).
2
Although there were only three dissenters in Greer, Justice Stevens, who concurred
with the five-justice majority, concurred on procedural grounds and, in writing
4

756, 766 n.8 (1987). 3 It is not binding on the states because it was not part of the
Court's due process analysis in that case, see id. at 766, and it is not particularly
persuasive because the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure contain no analogue to
Idaho Criminal Rule 29.1. 4

Thus, it is not surprising that, in reviewing district court

denials of defense motions for mistrials in instances where "curative instructions" were
given, the Idaho Supreme Court has never embraced (or even acknowledged) this
standard. See, e.g., State v. Johnson, 148 Idaho 664, 670 (2010) (making no mention

separately, made it clear that, on the substantive question, he agreed with the three
dissenting justices. See Greer, 483 U.S. at 767 (Stevens, J., concurring).
3
In Greer, the United States Supreme Court evaluated a situation where the
prosecutor, in cross-examining the defendant, asked the defendant about his postarrest silence in an effort to have the jury infer the defendant's guilt from his silence.
See Greer, 483 U.S. at 759. The Court held that the prosecutor's question did not
constitute a due process violation akin to that which was found in Doyle v. Ohio, 426
U.S. 610 (1976), see Greer, 483 U.S. at 761-65, and that, although the prosecutor's
action in asking an inappropriate question constituted misconduct, under the facts of the
case, it was not prejudicial as to constitute a due process violation. In reaching this
latter conclusion, the Court found it significant that the misconduct consisted of a single
question, which was never answered, and which elicited an immediate objection, which
was sustained, leading to two curative instructions. See Greer, 483 U.S. at 765-67. (As
discussed in note 2, supra, four justices-three dissenting justices and one concurring
justice-disagreed with the majority on this point.) With regard to the curative
instruction, the Supreme Court dropped a lengthy footnote, the second paragraph of
which began as follows:
We normally presume that a jury will follow an instruction to disregard
inadmissible evidence inadvertently presented to it, unless there is an
"overwhelming probability" that the jury will be unable to follow the court's
instructions, Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 208, 107 S. Ct. 1702, _,
95 L. Ed. 2d 176 (1987), and a strong likelihood that the effect of the
evidence would be "devastating" to the defendant, Bruton v. United States,
391 U.S. 123, 136, 88 S. Ct. 1620, 1628, 20 L. Ed. 2d 476 (1968) ....

Greer, 483 U.S. at 767 n.8. Of course, this standard, cobbled together from other cases
for the first time in Greer, would not have actually applied in Greer because the issue in
that case did not involve inadmissible "evidence" because the prosecutor's improper
question was not "evidence," and because, even if the prosecutor's improper question
was "evidence," it was intentionally, not inadvertently, presented.
5

of Greer, recognizing that "a limiting instruction alone cannot always prevent an error
from prejudicing the defendant," and vacating a lewd conduct conviction based on the
erroneous admission of "prior bad act" evidence even though the jury was instructed not
to consider the "bad act" evidence as probative of the defendant's guilt); Van Brunt v.
Stoddard, 136 Idaho 681, 686-87 (2001) (making no mention of Greer or the abovequoted standard in evaluating a claim of error revolving around the district court's
decision to give a curative instruction instead of declaring a mistrial when a witness
misspoke and gave inappropriate testimony).
Nevertheless, in 2004, the Idaho Court of Appeals employed the reasoning of
footnote 8 in Greer in affirming a district court decision denying a defendant's motion for
a mistrial when a government witness (a police detective) blurted out information
prejudicial to the defendant. State v. Hill, 140 Idaho 625, 630-31 (Ct. App. 2004). It
held as follows:
A mistrial may be granted only where there is an "error or legal
defect in the proceedings, or conduct inside or outside of the courtroom,
which is prejudicial to the defendant and deprives the defendant of a fair
trial."
I.C.R. 29.1. The admission of improper evidence does not
automatically require the declaration of a mistrial. Where improper
testimony is inadvertently introduced into a trial and the trial court promptly
instructs the jury to disregard such evidence, it is ordinarily presumed that
the jury obeyed the court's instruction entirely. No less an authority than
the United States Supreme Court has proclaimed:
We normally presume that a jury will follow an instruction to
disregard inadmissible evidence inadvertently presented to
it, unless there is an "overwhelming probability" that the jury
will be unable to follow the court's instructions, and a strong
likelihood that the effect of the evidence would be
"devastating" to the defendant.
4

The Federal Rules do contain a Rule relating to mistrials; however that Rule simply
requires that, before declaring a mistrial, the federal court must hear input from both
parties. FED. R. CRIM. P. 26.3.
6

Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 766 n. 8 ....
The court here instructed the jury to disregard the prosecutor's
question, and the prosecutor's disclosure to the jury that Hill had been in
jail could hardly be characterized as "devastating." Given that Hill was on
trial for a criminal offense, even in the absence of the prosecutor's
question, any reasonably knowledgeable juror likely would have surmised
that Hill had at some point been in jail. Hill has not demonstrated that she
was denied a fair trial. Accordingly, we hold that the district court did not
err in denying her motion for a mistrial.
Hill, 140 Idaho at 631 (some citations omitted). In Hill, however, the Court of Appeals
made no attempt to explain how this new standard from Greer ought to be reconciled
with the accepted "reversible error" standard.
Since 2004, the Court of Appeals has discussed the Greer/Hill standard twice
more.

In 2008, in State v. Grantham, 146 Idaho 490 (Ct. App. 2008), the Court of

Appeals employed that standard in affirming a district court denial of a defense motion
for a mistrial when a government witness (again, a police detective) gave arguably
inadmissible testimony which the State had stipulated that it would not present;
however, in doing so, the Court of Appeals recognized that in State v. Martinez, 136
Idaho 521 (Ct. App. 2001 ), it had articulated a different, far less onerous standard
concerning the question of how a "curative instruction" impacts a defendant's appellate
claim that the district court erred in denying his motion for a mistrial. 5 Grantham, 146
Idaho at 497-99 & n.1.

In so doing, although the Grantham Court evidenced a

preference for the ~1igher Greer/Hill standard, it did not explicitly reject the lower

5

The competing standard, set forth in State v. Martinez, 136 Idaho 521 (Ct. App. 2001 ),
does not speak in terms of an "overwhelming probability" that the jury was unable to
follow the "curative instruction" and a "strong likelihood" that the improper testimony was
"devastating" to the defendant; it requires only that "it is likely that the adverse effect of
the improper testimony might not be eradicated by the instruction." Martinez, 136 Idaho
at 526 (emphasis added).
7

standard and, thus, left open the question of which standard is required under Idaho
law. 6 See id. at 498 n.1.
Earlier this year, the Court of Appeals revisited the Greer/Hill standard in State v.
Norton, 151 Idaho 176 (Ct. App. 2011 ).

In that case, although the Court again

acknowledged the Greer/Hill standard, 7 it recognized that, read strictly, the Greer/Hill
standard would be distinct from the "reversible error" standard that has long been
applied to claims of error involving a failure to grant a defense motion for a mistrial.
Thus, the Norton Court attempted to reconcile the two standards and, in doing so, made
it clear that satisfaction of the discreet elements of the Greer/Hill standard is not a strict
requirement for a defendant appealing the district court's decision to deny his motion for
a mistrial. It explained as follows:
The parties argue over what standard should be applied to a
motion for a mistrial, with Norton arguing the standard harmless error test
set forth in Urquhart, and the State arguing the language from Grantham
with respect to whether there is an overwhelming probability that the jury
was unable to follow the court's instruction. Grantham did not attempt to
change the standard; rather, it makes clear that where a court gives a
curative instruction, the appellate court may consider that factor in
determining whether the alleged error is reversible.
Norton, 254 P.3d at 94 (emphasis added). 8

6

Notably, in balding asserting that the Greer/Hill standard is the law in Idaho, the State
has failed to cite to Grantham or Martinez, or otherwise recognize the existence of a
competing standard.
7
Although the Norton Court relied on Grantham, it did not discuss the far-less-onerous
standard that had been articulated in Martinez and mentioned in Grantham. See
Norton, 254 P.3d at 94.
8
Although the State cites Norton in its briefing, it incorrectly suggests that Norton
supports its position that Mr. Watkins has an affirmative obligation to prove that there is
an "overwhelming probability" that the jury was unable to disregard Officer Archuletta's
improper statements, and that there is a "strong likelihood" that those statements were
"devastating" to his defense. (See Respondent's Brief, p.7.) Nowhere in its brief does
the State recognize that in Norton the Court of Appeals significantly curtailed the
applicability of the Greer/Hill standard. (See generally Respondent's Brief.)
8

With this clarification by the Norton Court, and in light of the truism that it is the
State's burden to show that an error occurring in a criminal case was harmless beyond
a reasonable doubt, State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, _, 245 P.2d 961, 973 (2010), it
simply cannot be that Mr. Watkins had an affirmative obligation in this appeal to prove
that there is an "overwhelming probability" that the jury was unable to disregard Officer
Archuleta's improper statements, and that there is a "strong likelihood" that those
statements were "devastating" to his defense.

Accordingly, the State's attempt to

impose this burden on Mr. Watkins is meritless.

C.

The District Court Erred In Denying Mr. Watkins' Motion For A Mistrial
In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Watkins argued that Officer Archuleta's statements

about Mr. Watkins' previous trial and appeal likely led the jurors to the correct
conclusion that he had previously been found guilty by a different jury, only to have his
conviction overturned on appeal.

(Appellant's Brief, p.14.)

He then argued that

presentation of this information to the jury was so improper and so highly prejudicial that
it deprived him of a fair trial and, thus, warranted a mistrial. (Appellant's Brief, pp.1516.)
As noted above, the State offers three arguments in response.

First, after

mischaracterizing the applicable legal standard, the State seeks to have this Court rule
against Mr. Watkins for not having satisfied a non-existent standard. Second, the State
sets up a "straw man" argument by mischaracterizing one of Mr. Watkins' arguments as
a statement of "fact," then knocks down its "straw man" by pointing out that the district
court concluded otherwise.

Finally, based on its own interpretation of Officer

Archuletta's testimony (construing that testimony as alerting the jury only to the fact of a

9

prior trial, not a guilty verdict), the State argues that the district court was correct to have
denied Mr. Watkins' motion for a mistrial.
For the reasons set forth in detail below, the State's arguments are without merit.

1.

Mr. Watkins' Claim Is Not Procedurally Defaulted, Or Otherwise Deficient,
For Failing To Incorporate An Argument On A !\Jon-Existent Standard

As noted, the State's arguments in this case begin with the assumption that,
because the district court gave a "curative instruction" in response to Officer Archuleta's
improper statements (instructing the jurors not to speculate as to the result of
Mr. Watkins' first trial), it is now Mr. Watkins' burden to "show[ ] that 'there is an
"overwhelming probability" that the jury [was] unable to follow the court's instructions,
and a strong likelihood that the effect of the [statements] [was] "devastating" to"' to him.
(Respondent's Brief, p.7.) The State then goes on to argue that because Mr. "Watkins
has failed to present authority or argument addressing [this] legal standard" and,
instead, only argues the harmless error standard, "he has failed to meet his appellate
burden of showing an abuse of discretion by the trial court." (Respondent's Brief, pp.89.) This argument is frivolous.
First, for the reasons set forth in Part B, supra, the standard argued by the State
(the Greer/Hi/I standard) is not the applicable standard.

Idaho law dictates that the

controlling standard is the "reversible error" standard. And this is the precise standard
that Mr. Watkins argued throughout his Appellant's Brief.

(See generally Appellant's

Brief.)
Second, to the extent that the language of the Greer/Hi/I standard has any
continued vitality, it can only be understood to describe one consideration in the larger

10

"reversible error" standard. See Norton, 254 P.3d at 94. And, since Mr. Watkins clearly
argued the "reversible error" standard, he has undoubtedly met his burden, if any, 9 of
providing adequate argument and authority under Idaho Appellate Rule 35(a)(6).
Third, and somewhat ironically, in attempting to default Mr. Watkins for failing to
present argument or authority, the State has failed to cite any authority in support of its
own argument.

(See Respondent's Brief, pp.8-9.)

As such, the State's argument

cannot be considered on appeal. See State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263 (1996) ("A
party waives an issue cited on appeal if either authority or argument is lacking .... ") 10 ;

I.AR. 35(b)(6).
2.

Mr. Watkins' Claim Is Not Undercut By Any "Fact"-Finding By The District
Court

The State's second argument for affirming the district court's denial of
Mr. Watkins' motion for a mistrial is based on its belief that the district court found, as a
factual matter, that the jury was not informed that Mr. Watkins was previously convicted
on the same charge. (Respondent's Brief, pp.8, 9-10.) After characterizing the district
court's conclusion in this regard as a "factual" finding, the State then goes on to argue
that Mr. Watkins has failed to challenge this "factual" finding as clearly erroneous, and it

9

As noted above, it is the State's burden to show that an error is harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt if it seeks to have the appellate court affirm a conviction despite the
existence of error below; it is not the defendant-appellant's burden prove that an error
was not harmless.
10
Although Zichko dealt with an appellant's failure to provide authority or argument, it
actually spoke in broader terms, couching its holding in terms of "a party" who fails to
provide authority or argument. Zichko, 129 Idaho at 263. And, indeed, this broader
languqge makes infinite sense since the holding of Zichko was based on the appellant's
failure to comply with I.AR. 35, which requires not only that the appellant's brief
"contain the contentions of the appellant ... , the reasons therefor, with citations to the
authorities, citations and parts of the transcript and record relied upon," I.AR. 35(a)(6),
but also that the respondent's brief contain such things. I.AR. 35(b)(6).
11

asserts that the record would not support such an argument anyway. (Respondent's
Brief, pp.9-10.)
The State's argument lacks merit. Because the district court's interpretation of
Officer Archuleta's testimony was not a factual finding, but rather an objective
evaluation of how that testimony was likely understood by the jury, is not entitled to
deference on appeal. 11 The reality is that Officer Archuleta's testimony speaks for itself
and this Court is as well equipped to determine what the jury in this case likely took
away from that testimony as was the district court. In other words, the district court's
interpretation of Officer Archuleta's testimony is no more a "fact" entitled to deference
than is an interpretation of the meaning of a witness's comment on the defendant's
silence or a prosecutor's misstatement of the defense theory.
Troutman,

148

Idaho

904,

908-09

(Ct.

App.

2010)

See, e.g., State v.

(finding

an

improper

mischaracterization of the defense theory by the prosecutor even though the district
court had made no finding as to whether the prosecutor had mischaracterized the
defense theory); State v. Poland, 116 Idaho 34, 36-37 (Ct. App. 1989) (finding an
improper comment on the defendant's post-arrest silence even though the district court
had made no finding as to whether the prosecutor and responding witness actually
raised an inference of guilt through their dialogue concerning the defendant's silence).
Indeed, this Court frequently finds itself in the position of having to evaluate the impact
of certain evidence on the jurors. See, e.g., Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279-80

11

As a reminder, Officer Archuleta testified as follows: "In my transcript from the-well,
can I say that because I was told I can't talk about the prior trial. . . . I read the
transcript of the prior trial after the appeals court .... " (No. 37906 Jun. 21 2010 Tr.,
p.88, L.13-p.89, L.1.)
12

(1993) (calling upon the appellate court to determine what effect, if any, a trial error had
upon the jury's verdict).
In light of the reality that the district court's conclusion that Officer Archuleta's did
not inform the jury that Mr. Watkins was found guilty by a jury at his first trial was not a
factual finding entitled to deference on appeal, Mr. Watkins submits that the State's
argument on this point should be disregarded. Furthermore, for the reasons stated in
his Appellant's Brief (p.14), he submits that this Court should find that Officer
Archuleta's testimony did likely inform the jury of the results of the first trial.

3.

Turning To The Merits Of Mr. Watkins' Claim, It Is Clear That The District
Court Erred In Denying His Motion For A Mistrial

In its third argument, the State finally reaches the merits of Mr. Watkins'
contention on appeal-that Officer Archuleta's testimony deprived him of a fair trial such
that it was error to have denied his motion for a mistrial-and argues that Mr. Watkins
failed to establish any error in this regard.

(See Respondent's Brief, pp.10-12.)

In

presenting this argument, however, the State relies on the premise of its second
argument-that Officer Archuleta's testimony did not inform the jury of the outcome of
Mr. Watkins' first trial. (See Respondent's Brief, pp.10-12.)
However, for the reasons set forth in Part C(2), above, and in Mr. Watkins'
Appellant's Brief (p.14 ), it ought to be clear that Officer Archuleta's testimony did, in fact,
inform the jury of the outcome of Mr. Watkins' first trial. Accordingly, the State's third
argument is simply irrelevant. 12

12

As should be apparent from Mr. Watkins' Appellant's Brief, it Officer Archuleta's
testimony is interpreted as not having revealed the outcome of the first case, only the
fact that a trial occurred, Mr. Watkins cannot prevail in the present appeal. The crux of
13

The only relevant question is whether, assuming Officer Archuleta did reveal the
outcome of Mr. Watkins' first trial, that disclosure rendered Mr. Watkins' unfair, such that
a mistrial should have been declared. On this point, Mr. Watkins, the district court, 13 the
State, 14 and the bulk of the authority 15 all seem to be in agreement in concluding that
the trial was unfair and the mistrial should have been declared.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, as well as those set forth in his Appellant's Brief,
Mr. Watkins respectfully requests that this Court vacate his conviction and sentence,
and that it remand his case for a new trial.
DATED this 3 rd day of November, 2011.

ERK . r: H
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender

his claim is that his trial was rendered unfair through Officer Archuleta's disclosure,
albeit implicit, of the fact that Mr. Watkins was previously found guilty of the same
charge at his first trial.
13
The district court specifically warned the prosecutor that any explicit mention of the
fact that Mr. Watkins had been found guilty at the first trial, or had been sent to the
penitentiary after the first trial, would result in a mistrial. (No. 37906 Jun. 22, 2010 Tr.,
p.109, Ls.10-13.)
14
As noted above, it appears that the State would concede that if this Court finds that
Officer Archuleta informed the jury of the outcome of the first trial, a mistrial would have
been required. (See Respondent's Brief, pp.9-11.)
15
(See Appellant's Brief, pp.9-11 (compiling cases).)
14
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